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Imperialism has been an oft used word to describe the United States’ role in the world.
Concerning American foreign policy throughout its history, two overall camps have formed; one sides
with identifying imperialistic tendencies on the part of America and the other argues this is overblown,
even nonsense. One flash point is the Monroe Doctrine and its implications, with the former camp using it
as a case study for early American imperialism and the other arguing it was created to defend American
interests and ideals, while attempting to prevent European encroachment in the Western Hemisphere.
When looking at the Doctrine after its original declaration, an argument can be made of its use in
America’s expansion of influence, particularly during the early twentieth century (i.e., the Roosevelt
Corollary). In regards to the actual Doctrine however, this is a fairly myopic view, totally discounting the
time in which the Monroe Doctrine was written and declared to the world, which was very defensive and
idealistic in nature. This reasoning can be supported with several points. The Founders, including
President Monroe, had broken away from an imperial power and were against imperialism. Europe was in
the midst of great upheaval, still recovering from the Napoleonic Wars and threatening liberal institutions.
Latin America was aflame in revolution, shaking off the yolk of Spain, potentially finding Europe back at
their doorstep. There was plenty of reason for the Monroe cabinet to feel defensive, rather than imperial,
about American ideals and interests leading up to 1823.
As with many things concerning foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine was not created in a
vacuum with a simplistic world surrounding it. Going back to approximately 1800, with some brief and
early mentions to instances before the new century, this work addresses what went into the reasoning and
imperativeness for the Doctrine to be put before the world. After a brief overview of the document and
review of the literature surrounding it, the backgrounds of the two most important men behind this pivotal
document, James Monroe and John Quincy Adams, are explored. The Doctrine was aimed at the potential
interference in the Americas, so the old order in Europe is delved into, particularly: Metternich, Tsar
Alexander I and the Holy Alliance. Latin America and their relations with United States are explored,
with the U.S. believing the newfound republics to be importance to the former’s political and diplomatic
position, not to mention ideals. Finally, the American perspective is given great detail, much of which
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was under the shadow of Great Britain. Going from the Jay Treaty, to the War of 1812, all the way to the
Monroe Doctrine unveiling in December 1823, this is given the bulk of analysis. The ultimate primer for
making such a doctrine was prompted by the letter of British Foreign Secretary George Canning to the
American minister in London. This wraps a up whirlwind of events occurring domestically and
internationally to put pressure on President Monroe to create and openly declare his foreign policy with
boldness in 1823, which is now known as the Monroe Doctrine.
In making a brief review of the Monroe Doctrine, it was written as a direct repudiation of future
European colonization and calling for a policy of noninterference from the Europeans in the young Latin
American republics. After making brief mention of negotiations with the Russian and British
governments, the Doctrine clearly states,
As a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the
American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed
and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by
any European powers. . .1
It continues to reassert the independence of the republics throughout, telling the Europeans they may keep
their current colonies, but no new ones must rise. There is also a call for neutrality among not only among
the European governments, but declaring the U.S. government would remain so as well. Finally, there is
no doubt about which side the United States took in a potential future struggle in Latin America.
It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making
in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries… The
citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty
and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic.2
While the United States was hardly a robust military power at this point in history, it is interesting to note
the boldness and idealism coming from the Monroe Doctrine. Yet this has not dulled the debate as to
whether this statement of principles and ideals was a straightforward declaration, or a cover for future
American imperialism.
It would be easy to say the Monroe Doctrine was a quiet opening salvo, from which the United

1
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States was going to begin her own empire in the shadows of Europe. This is supported by Jay Sexton, a
more recent scholar on the subject. In the introduction to his book, he immediately discusses how the
Doctrine was both a document to push away potential colonial powers, but also “within it lurked the
imperial ambitions of the expansionist United States.”3 He goes on further, by saying how paradoxical the
Doctrine is, hinting that even though he sees this as the beginning of a subtle imperialist ploy, there were
still defensive objectives at play.4 Meanwhile, Dexter Perkins, is far more in line with the defensive
nature of the Doctrine. While he disavows perceived misconceptions of the Monroe Doctrine, such as it
was welcomed sign from Latin America or that it “prevented the reconquest of South America,”5 Perkins
remains more grounded. Rather than looking for proverbial imperialist monsters to slay, Perkins is
content to take more of direct approach to the Monroe Doctrine, seeing it as declaration of nonentanglement and separating America from Europe.6 Ernest May looks directly at the men who shaped the
Monroe Doctrine. He believes that they were shaped by one of three motives: national interest,
international politics, or domestic politics.7 He tends to lean towards the last, but is still open-minded
enough to admit he is not totally sure as to if this is completely definite or not.8 While important to view
the inner workings of the United States during this early nineteenth century period, the world at large was
still moving too.
Leading up to Monroe Doctrine’s declaration in 1823, one must look back the changes going on
in Latin America and Europe, during this crucial period for the United States during the early nineteenth
century. Latin America was of great concern to the United States around 1808, due in large part that
American commerce with the region had greatly expanded in the prior decade.9 Arthur Preston Whitaker
3
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goes into detail of how Latin America and the United States were becoming closer in their relations
during and after the exploits of Napoleon. The United States after the Latin American uprisings had even
firmer economic and diplomatic ties in the region, which had been far more isolated when it had been
under Spanish rule.10 In regards to the European powers’ intrigue in Latin America and disregard for
liberalism (e.g., republicanism, exemplified by the United States), this is crucial to understanding the
post-Napoleonic political landscape. As the 1820s began, the once liberal Tsar Alexander I was now
absolutist and reactionary in response to revolutions throughout Europe.11 Hiroo Nakajima provides this
as the precursor to American nervousness about this change of heart. The Monroe Doctrine was also a
warning to Russia to not expand into what it is the Pacific Northwest in the early 1820s.12 There was
American concern with the Holy Alliance, which Russia was a part of. Henry A. Delfiner explores the
Holy Alliance, which potentially threatened the new Latin American republics and the United States.
Driven in large part by the Austrian foreign minister Metternich, the Holy Alliance was against the ideals
of liberalism and republicanism, actions taken by its members in the 1810s and 1820s supporting this.13
The U.S. was in constant worry that the Holy Alliance had future designs in Latin America. This sets the
international stage in which Monroe’s government felt compelled to take a stand.
The Major Players: James Monroe and John Quincy Adams
International moving documents and doctrines do not just come out of thin air, or from
theoretical discussions in the salon. They are created by the men who are in the arena and in the case of
the Monroe Doctrine, it was President James Monroe and then-Secretary of State John Quincy Adams.
Looking at where both men came from and what drove them is key to understanding the Doctrine. When
viewing both American icons, it was not imperialism that drove them, but national interest and defense of
liberal ideals is what gave these men purpose in their lives. The Monroe Doctrine embodies much of what
10
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both Monroe and Adams, which was indicative of what the United States stood for.
James Monroe is found to be a simple man, yet he is a truly revolutionary figure in both
American history and foreign policy. Born in Virginia to a father described as a “patriot,” for his reaction
to the Stamp Act, and nephew to a judge who was co-creator of Virginia’s Constitution, Monroe was a
man steeped in American patriotism from a young age.14 He was described to have “resembled his uncle
in many ways—reflective, never rushing conclusions but forming opinions deliberately. The same tact,
warmth, patience in human relations, so pronounced in the judge’s character, were equally apparent in the
nephew.”15 These traits would serve Monroe not only when he was drafting his Doctrine, but in his near
future too. He joined the Continental Army under George Washington in May of 1776 as a lieutenant.16
His greatest moment in the Revolution was at the Battle of Trenton on Christmas Day, 1776, in which
Lieutenant Monroe distinguished himself in battle, but received a crippling shoulder wound.17
Unfortunately due to this and needs back in his home state of Virginia, Monroe was basically sidelined
the rest of the war.18 Despite this disappointment, Monroe became a driven man in the field of national
security, no doubt due to his military background.
After briefly falling into the background, Monroe became a pivotal figure in American
politics. In 1790, he became a Senator from Virginia for the newly minted U.S. Senate, the body
dealing with foreign affairs in the Congress.19 Monroe’s Republican bona fides allowed him to receive
nomination to become the minister to France when the post opened up.20 This led to Monroe’s eventual
appointment, which he accepted in 1794. In 1797, he became governor of Virginia and began to air his
views on national security. Originally much in favor of militias and somewhat tepid about standing
armies,21 Monroe tried to gain more funding for the state’s defenses.22 This view would change in the next
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few years though. After being the successful diplomat to secure Louisiana from France in 1803, he was
also sent to London to end the impressments of American sailors on British ships.23 This was
unsuccessful, but again, the old warhorse was to return. Becoming Secretary of State under Madison,
Monroe would see first-hand that having a larger and more permanent military was prudent. When the
War of 1812 broke out, after the impressment crisis had come to a head, but with mainly a citizen army to
draw upon, the results ended with near disaster. Eventually being thrown into both positions of Secretary
of State and War, Monroe wished to have a volunteer army to fight the British, but this was constantly
denied by Congress.24 In 1814, the lack of a large army or navy to beat back the British ended with
Washington D.C. being captured. Although despite not being an active military commander, Monroe
organized what had been a chaotic defense, conducting himself with professionalism and calm.25 The
devastation of Washington and other parts of the nation would leave a lasting legacy on his psyche.
Having served as an accomplished officer in the Continental Army and in various political offices
that required concern to national security and foreign affairs, James Monroe perhaps found himself the
most qualified president in those fields combined when he was inaugurated in 1817. Assuming the office,
the fifth President immediately set himself to the national defenses. Still reliving the scars of the War of
1812, Monroe called upon his countrymen to rally and not allow what happened to the nation’s capital to
ever happen again.
Experiencing the fortune of other nations, the United States may be again involved in
war, and it may, in that event be the object of the adverse party to overset our
Government, to break our Union and demolish us as a Nation. Our distance from Europe,
and the just, moderate, and pacific policy of our Government, may form some security
against those dangers, but they ought to be anticipated and guarded against… We must
support our rights or lose our character, and with it perhaps our liberties. A people who
fail to do it can scarcely be said to hold a place among independent nations.26
With this as a policy to strive towards, Monroe began to lobby extensively for costal fortifications and
21
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increasing the size of the national army.27 While largely unsuccessful in his efforts, due in large part to
budget cuts in the War Department beginning in 1821 (a bad depression was the main cause of the cuts),
Monroe kept up his fervor, always advocating increased awareness to national security and the state of the
military.28 He realized, especially after the previous war with Britain, that nice words and diplomacy were
not adequate to defend the national interest. With European intrigue all around the United States, from
Russia in the west, Britain to the north and Spain to the south, there were plenty of issues at hand for the
United States. From this, the stage was set for a man who was ready to declare to the world that the
United States was not willing to have European encroachment in Western Hemisphere. A firm stand was
needed and deemed the only way to ensure the defense of the country, which Monroe was always
thinking about with paramount importance. He was not alone in this thinking amongst his countrymen.
John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State under President Monroe, is of near equal or equal
importance to the president and the doctrine named after him. The sixth president of the United States is
perhaps better known for his diplomatic successes (including his part concerning the Monroe Doctrine)
before his presidency, and his anti-slavery stance afterwards. Born in 1767, he had quite a reputation to
live up to in his formative years because of his father, John Adams.29 A devoutly reverent Christian, his
religious views would guide him throughout his life, which were instilled into him particularly by his
mother.30 An excerpt from his diary the year the Monroe Doctrine was declared, Adams gives praise to
Christ, “All-gracious Parent! On my bended knee This dawning day I consecrate to Thee… Still grant me
Lord, possession of my soul…”31 It would soon become part of his diplomatic and patriotic code.
As Britain and France marched to war against each other in the mid-1790s, Adams had already
identified as a Federalist.32 His brilliant oratory skills brought him high acclaim from the likes of Treasury
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Secretary Alexander Hamilton and President George Washington (and no doubt his father, the current
Vice President), which helped earn the position of minister to the Netherlands.33 He would later be moved
to Portugal and moved again to the diplomatic post in Prussia over the next few years. In 1802, Adams
having returned home, became a Senator from his homes state of Massachusetts, whose body was both
powerful and involved far more in foreign affairs.34 All of these experiences would guide his future career
and give him the experience to become the major player he would become regarding the Monroe
Doctrine. After some affiliations with the Republican party (which would prove fortuitous in the future),
Adams was confirmed as the minister to Russia in 1809, gaining bipartisan support and disapproval.35
This would prove vital, as the Russians would figure prominently during 1823.
Minister Adam’s relations with Tsar Alexander I were most amicable, including Adams
protecting U.S. interests in Russian and other foreign ports, along with deep conversations pertaining to
the United States a land that had fascinated the Tsar.36 Alexander was so impressed by the United States
and her ideals, he believed the liberal notions supported by the U.S. were for the betterment of the
world.37 When France invaded Russia in 1812, and the U.S. was at war with England (now Russia’s ally),
Adams still was so apt in his negotiations and had such positive relations with the Tsar, Alexander was
even willing to mediate the conflict between the U.S. and England.38 As the wars in both Europe and the
United States were drawing to an end, Adams wished to bring peace to his country with the hope that God
would guide him and his country to that peace. “On the providence of God alone is my reliance… The
welfare of my family and country, with the interests of humanity, are staked upon the event. To Heaven
alone it must be committed.”39 Peace soon became a reality in part due to his negotiations at the Treaty of
Ghent,40 which did not improve his feelings towards the English (and would be on display towards them

33
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when the Monroe Doctrine was written.41 After these and many other successes, Adams was asked to join
the new Monroe administration in 1817, as Secretary of State.42 This would be one of the most interesting
and incredible pairings in American history.
While Adams had a distinguished career as a diplomat abroad, his greatest service to his country
in overseas affairs would occur while at home. In 1819, he accomplished a great feat by negotiation with
Spain, gaining the territory of Florida and establishing boundaries between the Louisiana Purchase and
still Spain controlled Mexico (part of today’s American Southwest).43 One of his primary interests had
been to protect American settlements in the South from Indian raids, while the Spanish had been unable
(or unwilling?) to get a handle on the situation. He even went so far as to support General Andrew
Jackson’s aggressive incursion into Florida before the Transcontinental Treaty was signed in 1819 and
ratified by the Spanish in 1821. Before this treaty had been set in stone, Adams was always in support of
republican government, but he was the one who advised Monroe against recognizing the new Latin
American governments to prevent incurring the wrath of Europe and the Holy Alliance, especially with
the treaty still in limbo. Eventually, before the Monroe Doctrine was declared, the U.S. recognized the
new Latin American republics, but this was not the end for Adams or his country’s interest in the region.
This interest though was to be frowned upon by the monarchial forces of Europe, evidenced by their
stances and actions during the early nineteenth century.
Metternich, the Holy Alliance and Europe
The nineteenth century, at least in terms of military and economic power, was a European one.
The United States was much weaker at this point in history and was constantly worried about actions not
only about her own security, but actions taken on the other side of the Atlantic too, particularly against
republican and liberal movements.44 Despite the ravages of the Napoleonic Wars on the Continent,
Europe’s national powers were still very much master of not only their own domains, but were looking

41

Dexter Perkins, Castleraegh and Adams (Berkley: University of California Press, 1964), 40-42, 130.
Remini, John Quincy Adams, 48-49.
43
Ibid, 54-56.
44
Perkins, Hands Off, 24.
42

Page 10 of 33
outwards as well. The post-Napoleonic landscape of Europe can be divided into the theoretical and the
more tangible: the Age of Metternich and the Holy Alliance respectively. First addressing Metternich, the
man was noble from birth and entrenched in the aristocracy.45 While more pragmatic than ultra
conservative, Metternich was still very much a man of order and against potentially upsetting ideologies,
such as liberalism.46 His contempt for these forms of governance was great and mirrored reactions of
many old regimes towards the republic. “While very much concerned with the state of the Habsburg
Empire, he also was interested in seeing the monarchies of Europe destroy or smother the forces of
disorder within the Continent. To do this, Metternich wished to use the Holy Alliance (which will be
addressed shortly) to be the instrument of order and rationalism.47 His force of will and opinion was so
strong, Metternich even swayed Tsar Alexander I of Russia to divest himself of liberal leanings.48 This is
what reigned in Europe from 1815-1848; the Age of Metternich.49
Not only was Metternich concerned with forces of liberalism and other anti-monarchial ideology,
but much of Europe was as well. The device that brought together these European forces however, was
originally not intended to suppress the people, but was soon used to do just that. Coming out of the final
push to destroy Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna was designed not only create the alliance to finally
finish off the French dictator, but also to reestablish the right of monarchs to rule.50 From this, came the
Holy Alliance, which was first proposed by Tsar Alexander I of Russia and came into being with Austria,
Prussia and Russia signing on. At first, the Alliance was for the nations of Europe to deal with each other
based on Christian principles (which was non-denominational, as Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants
engaged in the endeavor), even bringing in the common peoples’ concerns as part of the arrangement.56
However, Metternich stepped in, and changed the Alliance into an agreement between rulers, avoiding the
rights of the people and binding reforms such as constitutions. After France’s entry into the “Concert of
45
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Europe” (not exactly the Holy Alliance, but still brought her into the orbit of the Continental Alliance
members) in 1818, the Alliance began to move in ruthlessly against the forces of dissent and those against
monarchy.51 These post-Napoleonic stirrings were of great concern to the Alliance and to Metternich.
“Agitation after 1815 by Spanish liberals, German students, Italian carbonari and Greek patriots
convinced him that Europe, ‘visited by a plague,’ was ‘an object of pity to a man’s intellect, of horror to a
man’s virtue.’”52 Soon, the plague and objects of pity and horror were to be confronted directly, with the
concerned United States watching from afar.
By 1819, the forces of change and reform were under attack from the European powers.
One could only imagine what the United States, thousands of miles away, would think of such backward
and heavy-handed tactics which were to be employed against liberal forces. The Karlsbad Decrees53 of
1819 were brought about, giving the state more secret police powers within Austrian held Germany.54 The
Papal States were turning back the clock, reinstating dominance by the Catholic Church, restricting
freedoms and bringing back harsher law and justice.55 The forces of reaction affected the U.S. more
directly when an invasion fleet from Cadiz was prepared to leave Spain and restore rule over the former
Latin American colonies. Fortunately from the American and Latin American perspectives, a mutiny
occurred and the invasion was called off. In 1821, the full weight of the hammer began its descent. The
Austrians, squashed the rebellions of pro-liberal forces in Naples and Piedmont.56 Things became even
more unhinged, when Spain was invaded by the French in 1823, at the prodding of the Holy Alliance, due
to the overthrow of King Ferdinand VII. However, in one instance, the pendulum turned the other way.
Instead of aiding the rebels in Greece, who were Christians fighting against Muslim Turks, the Europeans
and particularly the Russians were keeping a hands off approach to the revolution in the early 1820s.57
51
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This greatly troubled President Monroe, who greatly admired the history of the Greeks. The liberal United
States was unnerved by the events occurring across the Atlantic and could only be discouraged by the
calamities occurring in Europe against those in favor of democracy and freedom.
Also of some notice to the United States was Russia. The very first line in the Monroe Doctrine
dealt directly with the Russian Empire, and her interest in what is now the Pacific Northwest of the
United States.58 This went against the initially good relations with Russia and her leader, Tsar
Alexander I and the American government. Thomas Jefferson became aware of Alexander’s liberal
leanings while Jefferson was representing the U.S. in France.59 By the end of Jefferson’s presidency, full
diplomatic relations were created, including cordial correspondence between the two chieftains. John
Quincy Adams, the first envoy from the United States to Russia, was received in 1809 in a very positive
manner from the tsar himself.60 This extended into the War of 1812, when Russia offered to mediate
between America and Britain, showing an obvious American bias.61 Things continued to go well till the
early 1820s, Anglophobia a uniting force. However, both Alexander and U.S.-Russian relations soured.
The tsar, under the influence of Metternich, went against his prior liberalism, instead upholding
monarchy.62 This was proven by Russian support for the overthrow of liberals in Piedmont and other
liberal reformers.63
Obviously, this was not welcomed news for the Americans, who were now disillusioned with the
once popular tsar. Former President Madison diplomatically wrote in 1821 he had “seen, not without
some little disappointment, the latter developments of character in the Emperor Alexander.”64 These ill
turns extended to diplomacy between the two countries, evidenced by disputes regarding what is now
British Colombia. In 1821, the Russian-American Company, interested in things such as otter pelts,
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wished to exclude British and American trade in the region.65 On September 16th, 1821, Alexander
declared a “ukaz,” claiming all territory down to the 51st parallel as Russian. This severely dampened
U.S.-Russian relations, so much so, that British Foreign Secretary George Canning said the “‘apparently
extravagant [Monroe] doctrine’ was ‘principally, if not specifically, directed against the no less
extravagant doctrine of the Russian Ukase of 1821.’”66 However, it was more than the intrigue of Russia,
the Holy Alliance or the rest of Europe; Latin America also loomed large, as they were at the heart of this
intrigue from Europe, putting the Americans on alert.
Latin America
In regards to Latin America, the United States certainly had interests in the region, but the main
concern was that the Europeans were hoping to reclaim what had been lost during the early nineteenth
century revolutions. With the non-colonization (or no re-colonization) principle in the Monroe Doctrine,
President Monroe put his nation on the world stage, due to his support of the newly formed Latin
republics and wish for Europeans to stay out of their affairs.67 However, to say that the United States had
absolutely no interest beyond national security and sending well wishes to the newly formed nations is
not entirely accurate either. Trade was beginning to flourish in the area and common interest of being
republics were things the U.S. could not ignore. This is supported by the constant Congressional
hankering for the “patriots of the south,” led by Representative Henry Clay.68 The history of this has been
misconstrued as American imperialism from the onset, but a record relating to defense of national interest
and idealism is apparent.
Not long after the founding of the United States and her Constitution, commerce with the world
was of great importance. In 1797, the Spanish created a royal order, declaring ports in their colonies
abroad open to neutral shipping as they battled England.69 This directly and mostly benefited the United
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States, the greatest of the neutral maritime navies.70 From 1796 to 1806, American total exports went up
from three percent to twelve percent to Spanish America as a result of this policy.71 This policy of freer
trade was obviously well received, but as the Napoleonic Wars raged in Europe, peace would eventually
come. It was feared that once peace came, this freer trade would fall back to the Spanish monopoly
amongst her colonies. The United States also wished to push back all commercial and political intrigue
from Europe in the newly established Latin republics, being a national priority since the end of the
Jefferson administration.72 It was also preferable to give the new republics recognition, so that other
nations would have to recognize them too, coupled with the fact that U.S. vessels of commerce would be
protected from piracy and other high seas interference.73 Some private American concerns were wishing
to stir the pot in favor of revolution, including John Jacob Astor’s vessel Beaver, which was intended to
supply arms to rebelling Latin Americans.74 However, other concerns were in play with recognition,
flying in the face of it.
Problems were emanating from East Florida (which is Florida today) for the United States.
Indians were constantly raiding the southern U.S. and fleeing back across the Floridian border to escape
American reprisals.75 The Spanish were either unable (or potentially unwilling?) to deal with this issue.
General Jackson moved throughout the region to pacify the raiders, even occupying Spanish garrison at
Pensacola.76 Already upsetting the Spanish and hoping to gain East Florida, the United States did not
want to anger Spain by going out on a limb for the newly minted Latin American republics.77 This was
finally done on February 22, 1819, with the signing of the Transcontinental Treaty, ceding Florida and all
Spanish territory north of the forty-second parallel to the Pacific Ocean.78 However, the treaty was not
formally recognized till 1821 by the Spanish, delaying any diplomatic movement. With this thorny issue
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resolved, the U.S. moved positively towards Latin America.
While sympathetic to the plight of the republics, the United States could not make a provocative
move against Spain going back to the early days of Latin American rebellion in 1810. From that moment
on, emissaries were sent to Washington, begging for assistance and more importantly recognition.79With
war all around and lack of strength, the U.S. was hardly in a position to take proactive stance, even as
time progressed. This did not mean American sympathies did not flow south, but until the problem with
East Florida was resolved, no action could be taken. After 1821, the Congress began to consider
recognizing the new governments to the south.80 Despite Spanish indignation at this turn in American
foreign policy, this did not dissuade the latter.81 Finally, now that angering Spain was no longer a concern,
recognition came in 1822, at the behest of President Monroe who went to the Congress requesting
appropriations for ministers.82 To move further though, the U.S. was in no position to do so, but the
region would still concern the republic mightily in the coming months and years.
The U.S. (and British)
Having looked at the international scene, it is clear the Monroe Doctrine did not just appear out of
thin air. The necessity for the Doctrine began fomenting from the time immediately after the Revolution.
There were numerous issues facing the new American nation with Great Britain: prewar debts, other
economic and trade issues, but perhaps most importantly, impressment of American sailors.83 When war
broke out between Britain and France in 1793, the stakes were raised when the British began to become
far more aggressive with neutral American shipping, resulting in the capture of those vessels heading to
France and her overseas holdings.84 This was made worse when the British captured approximately 300
ships before news of this new policy was announced publically.85 Despite different solutions to this
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daunting problem, including cutting off trade with Great Britain (proposed by the Republicans), John Jay
was sent in 1794 to Britain to broker a deal. When the Jay Treaty was finally consummated by both sides
in November, the U.S. gained British withdrawals from their garrisons in U.S. territory, commissions to
settle border disputes with Canada and American ships seized by the Royal Navy, limited trade with the
British West Indies and an avoidance of war.86 Once it was announced, there was backlash from the
Americans at home, though Jay stated “we [Americans] have reason to be satisfied.” This was not the
case of all Americans though, including James Monroe, then minister to France, asking for the full treaty
so that he and the concerned French could review it.87 This concern was not out of bounds, as issues such
as impressment were not addressed, and eventually there would be conflict over American individual and
commercial rights.
On land, things were not well either. With the rise of Napoleon, French overreach around the
world was not out of the question. In part due to worry about French control of Louisiana, especially the
vital port of New Orleans, where a large portion of U.S. commerce went through, the Jefferson
administration (with Monroe as emissary) decided to make the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.88 It was so
concerning to the American government, that Jefferson considered sending Monroe to consummate a
defensive treaty with England over French intrigue in Louisiana. Fortunately from the American
perspective, this was unnecessary with the Purchase, therefore not forcing the U.S. even more into Great
Britain’s orbit. As the Napoleonic Wars began to ratchet up, Jefferson went even further by placing an
embargo on all foreign trade in 1807, in order to avoid involvement in the war and based on the principle
of isolationism.89 This eventually was ended in 1809, no doubt due to Federalist opposition (mercantile
and trade interests),90 but this policy also staked out American unwillingness to be pulled in by potential
European suitors. Matters soon became more complicated again; this time, impressment of American
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sailors was rearing its ugly head once more. The Royal Navy’s need for sailors had not ceased as the
Napoleonic Wars were dragging on. It became so obnoxious, that a British frigate even brought an
American warship to heel, searching for “deserters” (some of whom were Americans escaping British
impressment ironically).91 Being pressed to the hilt concerning these and other issues with the British,
America had finally had enough.
On June 1st, 1812, President Madison delivered a message of war to Congress.92 He and
the much of the country had grown weary of the impressments and the president made an impassioned
call to action. “[American sailors] have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation; and
exposed, under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes, to risk
their lives in the battles of their oppressors…” With the British tied up in its war with Napoleonic France,
the war was fought to a basic standstill by the end of 1814.93 The American position was somewhat
enhanced by the battle for New Orleans in 1815,94 but the war revealed a woeful American military and
overall defensive system.95 It is no small wonder why Monroe, then Secretary of War and State, was so
concerned about defense of the nation, after seeing the White House burn, Washington D.C. occupied and
an inability to stop the British fleet. Even as the war came to an end and neutrality began to reign again,
American feelings of European outside influence had not changed, but a new wrinkle would challenge
this sentiment.
After the Treaty of Ghent was signed, relations began to thaw a bit between Great Britain and the
United States. Impressments of sailors ended not long after the War of 1812 concluded.96 While there was
no feeling of camaraderie amongst the two former enemies relations were beginning to find similar tracts.
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The United States was not the only nation interested in Latin American trade; Great Britain was just if not
more desirous for potential commercial relationship with the new republics. A country based largely on
trade, this makes perfect sense; a new market(s) had to be exploited, not only to benefit their own country,
and Britain could ill afford to lose out to her European competitors. Of less importance, Britain was far
less willing than the European Continental Powers to overthrow liberal uprisings in order to keep
establishment monarchies on their thrones.97 Seeing the situation growing more and more unstable,
including the French restoration foray into Spain in 1823, Britain had reasons to be worried. Should the
former colonies in Latin America be restored to Spanish (or other European) rule, trade in this
region could be dampened and potentially ended.98 This is where the Foreign Secretary for Great
Britain, George Canning, became a very, if not the most pivotal catalyst for movement from the
Monroe administration towards the Monroe Doctrine.
Meeting with the American minister to Britain, Richard Rush, in London in August 1823,
Canning made his great proposal.99 Canning proposed to Rush that the Latin American republics should
be allowed to maintain independence and that U.S. and Britain should in essence become allies to keep
European predations away from the former colonies.100 Rush was stunned, due in large part to their
countries’ past hostility towards each other. Later that month, Canning delivered his destiny filled letter to
Rush, which came to Monroe about six weeks later.101 In the letter, Canning outlines British intentions
related to the new republics with five major points:
1. We conceive the recovery of the Colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them as Independent States, to be one
of time and circumstances.
3. We are however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an
arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiations.
4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.
5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power, with
indifference.102
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Canning then wondered if Rush could get a similar declaration out of the American government,
and better yet, could Rush get his government to make a co-declaration with Canning’s?103 From
this, the wheels would be set in motion for the discussion within the Monroe administration; what
to do with this potentially fortuitous offer?
Back in Washington, Monroe was not only considering the letter from Canning, but all that had
and was currently going on in international affairs. As previously outlined in the earlier sections (i.e.,
Europe/Russia and Latin America), the world was not a seemingly pleasant place. Europe was overall a
reactionary and absolutist place, putting down liberalism anywhere it hoped to flourish. Latin America
was freeing much of itself from the bonds with Europe, but there was concern Europe, particularly Spain
and/or the Holy Alliance, would return to claim or reclaim what they felt was rightly theirs. Now with this
letter from the British government, how were Monroe and his deputies supposed to respond? At first,
many were extremely supportive of an arrangement with Britain. Even Monroe was fairly supportive at
first, when he wrote to his mentor at Monticello, Thomas Jefferson, “My own impression is that we ought
to meet the proposal of the British government.”104 Jefferson, the architect of the Declaration of
Independence was grudgingly, yet conversely extremely supportive of the move. “Great Britain is the
nation which can do us the most harm of any one… and with her on our side we need not fear the whole
world.”105 He went further, saying that while he did not wish for Britain to draw the U.S. into her wars,
this informal alliance would keep Europe out and allow for American ideals to flourish in the Western
Hemisphere. While not as enthusiastic as Jefferson, Madison was fairly supportive too. The Monroe
cabinet, including Secretary of War Calhoun, leaned heavily towards acceptance.106 From the American
perspective, why not support this great opportunity? It accomplished much of what the United States
wanted: it provided diplomatic support to the revolutionary governments in Latin America, forcing the
other European powers to stay out of the Hemisphere and put America in a far more powerful and
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respectable position on the world stage. Yet, not was all well in the Monroe cabinet, with one voice
saying no.
While this proposal of linking British and American interests was quite promising, and would
accomplish a great deal towards the United States’ (and President Monroe’s) wish for defense, it didn’t
sway Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. He was greatly concerned this would leave the U.S. in a
very vulnerable position.
The wily British statesman [Foreign Secretary Canning] declined to extend recognition to
the new states of Spanish America… portended a duplicitous reversal of British policy
that would leave the United States standing alone against the Holy Alliance.107
From this, the position of being defensive would go from being manageable, to an impossibly
difficult task. At first, Adams was at least somewhat supportive of the joint venture, but ultimately worry
of a potential double cross swayed him against Britain.108 This is not to say that Adams was against the
cause of Latin American countries fighting for their freedom against the Spanish and other European
intrigues, but he also was against being too aggressive towards the Europeans also.109 However, it should
be remembered that he was also against recognition of the Latin American republics before it was made
official in 1822. Even so, Adams was thinking very much of national interest, no matter what his personal
opinions were concerning idealism or supporting fellow republics. Both sides were deadlocked; one
represented by Adams and uncompromising national interest, the other representing more pragmatism and
putting the U.S. in a seemingly better position to promote her idealism on an unprecedented scale.
On October 11, 1823, Monroe and his cabinet began to discuss the contents of Canning’s letter.110
While both Calhoun and to a lesser extent Adams considered adopting some sort of accommodation with
the British, American outrage with their former mother country was evident amongst much of the
populace.111 There had been a letter from the top U.S. diplomat in Spain who was witnessing the French
incursion into the country, which outlined potential French and Russian interests in Latin America.112
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Baron Tyull, the Russian minister to the U.S., informed Adams that the Russian court would not receive
any Latin American envoys from the recently freed nations. The conversation in the executive branch
began to heat up in early November, with Monroe and Calhoun becoming very troubled that the Holy
Alliance would restore Spain’s colonies. Adams wrote on the thirteenth Monroe was alarmed with current
events. “‘Alarmed far beyond anything I could conceive possible’ and ‘the news that Cadiz [the last
liberal stronghold in Spain] has surrendered to the French has so affected him that he appeared entirely to
despair of the cause of South America.’”113 To add more fuel to the fire, there was grave concern that the
French fleet was going to transport royal Spanish troops, under King Ferdinand VII, back to Latin
America.114 It should be noted that at this time in history, not only was America not the dominant naval
power in the world, but was woefully outgunned. Her fleet was a quarter of the French’s fleet and oneeighth the size of Russia’s.115 Even with privateers and being closer to Latin America, “a combined
French and Russian intervention in American affairs would have constituted a considerable menace.”116
With this and the concern of British machinations, the Monroe cabinet had to respond in some meaningful
way.
The debate in the Monroe cabinet continued to grow more divided. While all agreed, even
Adams, that joining the British did have some advantages, Adams was wondering if pushing back the
European powers with a British alliance was even needed. Would the potential Holy Alliance be able to
enforce its will on the new republics, bringing them back into the fold, even for a time?117 Even if the
alliance with Britain was necessary, could there be another solution without the British? Adams began to
enforce his will in cabinet meetings, especially since it was his department that was charged with talking
to the British, the Russians and other concerned parties. Until the British recognized the Latin American
republics, Adams was not willing to move, no matter how enticing the deal appeared to be.118 Somehow,
112

Perkins, Hands Off, 40.
Ibid, 41.
114
May, The Making, 201.
115
Perkins, Hands Off, 59.
116
Ibid, 59.
117
May, The Making, 203.
118
Ibid, 206-207.
113

Page 22 of 33
Adams allayed Monroe’s fears, as the former was far less concerned about any invasion or direct
European intervention, but the latter believed there was a serious threat regardless of other cabinet
opinions.119 From an entry in Adams diary in early November, one can see the his desire for an American
declaration to set forth American principles; “‘It would be more candid, as well as more dignified,’
Adams concluded, ‘to avow our principles explicitly… than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the
British man-of-war.’”120 Eventually, Adams was able to use his diplomatic skill and logic to
overcome Monroe’s, Jefferson’s and the other pro-British alliance contributors to create a new American
policy.121 Now, America would move alone to declare the Western Hemisphere off limits and state the
American case for this defense.
Monroe was only days away from making his doctrine known, along with the other issues which
would be mentioned in his message to Congress. He collected all relevant information from each cabinet
position, including Adam’s State Department: this included addressing the Latin American republics U.S.
recognition, no mention of any British alliance or joint declaration and a new theme, “a declaration that
there should be no future European colonization in the Western Hemisphere.”122 There was also mention
of the Russian move into North America, denouncing the French and Holy Alliance crushing of liberal
Spain and recommending Congress allow for a minister to the rebels in Greece.123 Of these three, all but
the first was immediately rejected by Adams, believing this would hurt relations with several of the
European powers. Monroe, while not willing to go back on what he said, the President was also flexible
and quite possibly impressed with Adams passionate counter proposals.124 Adams was concerned the
unedited paragraphs could create an atmosphere of war brewing and that peace should be maintained if at
all possible. Instead of making bold proclamations about European policies,Adams wanted a softer
approach, telling Europe to stay out of the Americas and the Americans should stay out of European
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affairs.125 The debate continued though, with Adams and Calhoun fighting over their respective positions
almost till the deciding day of December 2nd.126 Now having the gift of foresight, Adams won the
argument in large part, with the Monroe Doctrine making far less egregious remarks, mentioning noncolonization, no interference with the new republics, etc.127 Although the Doctrine is only about one sixth
of the total address to Congress128, it was an excellent way to glean from the American government and
her people a discernable trait: idealism.
In the document itself though, while defensive, one cannot miss the idealism of it and the country
that put the Monroe Doctrine forth. Secretary of State Adams wrote after the French intervention in Spain,
whose idealism was instrumental in the forging of the Monroe Doctrine itself, gives credit to the spirit in
which the message was written.
The influence our example has unsettled all the ancient governments of Europe… It will
overthrow them all without exception. I hold this revolution to be as infallible as that the
earth will perform a revolution around the sun in a year.129
This idealism also was also apparent from President Monroe himself. While Adams preferred this
declaration to be sent through diplomatic dispatches to the European powers, Monroe wished to have this
message put through in Congress and allow the whole world to hear it.130 Rather than quietly proclaim the
principles of non-colonization and non-interference to the foreign ministers of Europe, Monroe wished to
tell the world the American way was better and the old regimes were on the wrong side of history. He
also had believed that United States was the example of the world, having allowed the revolutions of
Europe and South America to occur because of the American template131, so why not use this as a
doctrine to promote American principles all around the world? The response from around the world was
mixed, but mostly negative to these ideals and principles though.
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International Reaction
In Latin America, which the Monroe Doctrine primarily addressed, responses varied. In the more
conservative circles, the feelings amongst these people were “decidedly cool.”132 Many of them were
hoping and relying on the fact the British and the Royal Navy would protect them from any Continental
European incursions. Some of those in Latin America were concerned about territorial ambitions,
including the venerable Bolivar of Colombia and elites of Buenos Aires.133 However, it must be noted that
most of this opposition was conservative in nature, not likely to support liberal policies the United States
was often in favor of. In liberal Latin American circles, the response was much more favorable. The
Brazilian and Colombian governments heartily endorsed the Doctrine.134 It even inspired the country of
Chile to consider an alliance with the United States, though this was not practical or possible from the
American perspective. Europe would be far less pleased with this forward and idealistic document
though.
The British were perhaps the most affected by the Monroe Doctrine’s proclamation. While
Canning had clung to a potential concord with the Americans, his hopes were in essence dashed by the
Doctrine and the British position was now less assured in Latin America.135 It took some brilliant political
maneuvering on his part to put the Holy Alliance at ease about British interests in Latin America, as well
as domestic critics of the British government. Metternich was far more perturbed by the seemingly
petulant United States.
These United States of America which we have seen arise and grow… have suddenly left
a sphere too narrow for their ambition, and have astonished Europe a new act of revolt,
more unprovoked, fully as audacious, and no less dangerous than the former. They have
distinctly and clearly announced their intention to set not only power against power, but,
to express it more exactly, altar against altar. In their indecent declarations they have cast
blame and scorn on the institutions of Europe most worthy of
respect…136
Madrid, Berlin and Vienna expressed silence, which was also followed by Tsar Alexander I of Russia. He
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did express to his foreign minister in the United States, “the document in question enunciates views and
pretensions so exaggerated, it establishes principles so contrary to the rights of the European powers…
continue to maintain the silence…”137 The French were indignant about the non-colonization clause.
However, there was some support from Marquis de Lafayette (of American Revolutionary War fame),
who called it, “the best little piece of paper that God had ever permitted any man to give to the World.”
Unfortunately, from the American position, these compliments and congratulations were few and far
between from Europe.138 Rather than submitting to the British or cowering to the European powers, the
United States had staked out her territory and at the same time, defended liberal principles despite being
outnumbered and reviled in the international arena.
Conclusion
Even with all of this evidence, the Monroe Doctrine is still a lightning rod for debate about
whether it was imperialistic or defensive. However, the argument for imperialism from the United States
at this point in history is irrelevant. The United States was anything but an imperial power at this stage.
The Monroe Doctrine reflects this earlier nation; it obviously is, at least in its original form anything but
imperialistic. The Doctrine did not have mischievous intent lurking in the spaces of the written words.
Rather, it was a statement of principle and potentially a beacon of hope for the Americas and all those
who were interested in liberalism and a republican form of government. As noted earlier in this work,
there should be no question as to why and how this document came into being. The world was a far
scarier place for the United States in terms of balance of power in 1823. As previously shown, everything
the American government was doing, was on the defensive. Europe was in the midst of reclaiming the
rights of monarchs. Latin America, while lifting the bonds of rule from Spain, was in a tenuous position.
Would the Holy Alliance’s return to take back what they felt should be their right by God? No one could
rightly tell without guessing, though Adams did prove to be a great fortune teller. Instead of imperial
prestige, the U.S. was far more interested in mere defense at this point in her history than with any other
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matter. Her actual defenses were relatively weak, as the War of 1812 and the comparison of military
might with other powers has shown. The Monroe cabinet, still smarting from apparent weakness and
worry over what the European powers would do in the Western Hemisphere, were very worried over
about keeping the United States at arm’s length from the old regimes. Monroe the soldier and Adams the
diplomat, were men of principle, who wished to see America as a country that would rise above the
perceived world of tyrannical monarchy.
The letter from Canning was the final primer that pushed the Monroe Doctrine. After decades of
worrying about the Europeans and years of wondering if Latin America would free itself or not, Monroe
and Adams knew they had to respond. From this, the Monroe Doctrine was conceived and brought forth
to the world as speaking out against the potential and real trespasses of the European powers. From
Russia in the Pacific Northwest, to the Spanish and French intrigue concerning the Latin American
republics, to the British desire for commerce and potential domination of them, the United States shone a
light on these plans. Finally, it gave an idealistic message that was saying to the world that their way was
best; it was time to move on from the old plays for power and that republican and liberal ideas were the
wave of the future, and Europe should not interfere in the process, either with Latin America or the U.S.
While maybe not the divinely inspired creation that Lafeyette thought it was, the Monroe Doctrine is one
of defense in practicality and one defense in theory; a defense of American interests and a defense of the
idea that American values were a better way forward for a world perceived to be heading in the wrong
direction.
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Transcript of Monroe Doctrine (1823)
Note: The Monroe Doctrine was expressed during President Monroe's seventh annual message to
Congress, December 2, 1823:
. . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor
residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at
St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on
the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the
Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States
has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably
attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his
Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which
they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights
and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent
condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for
future colonization by any European powers. . .
It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and
Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted
with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very
different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so
much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested
spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty
and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in
matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.
It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for
our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected,
and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of
the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds
from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been
achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened
citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it,
therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to
declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any
European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have
declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration
and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing
them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as
the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new
Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have
adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgement of the
competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United
States indispensable to their security.
The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no
stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle
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satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent
such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers
whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none of them
more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the
wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to
interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the
legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a
frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to
injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously
different.
It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either
continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern
brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that
we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength
and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be
obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties
to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . . .
Transcription courtesy of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School.
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Appendix B
“English Background of the Monroe Doctrine”
Foreign Office, Aug. 20, 1823 Private and Confidential
My dear Sir:--Before leaving Town I am desirous of bringing before you in a more distinct, but still in an
unofficial and confidential shape, the question which we shortly discussed the last time that I had the
pleasure of seeing you.
Is not the moment come when our Governments might understand each other as to the Spanish American
Colonies? And if we can arrive at such an understanding, would it not be expedient for ourselves, and
beneficial for all the world, that the principles of it should be clearly settled and plainly avowed?
For ourselves we have no disguise.
1. We conceive the recovery of the Colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them. as Independent States, to be one of time and
circumstances.
3. We are however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement
between them and the mother country by amicable negotiations.
4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.
5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power, with indifference.
If these opinions and feelings are, as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours,
why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other; and to declare them in the face of the
world?
If there be any European Power which cherishes other projects, which looks to a forcible enterprise for
reducing the colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or in the name of Spain; or which meditates the
acquisition of any part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest; such a declaration on the part of your
government and ours would be at once the most effectual and the least offensive mode of intimating our
joint misaprrobation of such projects.
It would at the same time put an end to all the jealousies of Spain with respect to her remaining Colonies,
and to agitation which prevails in those Colonies, an agitation which it would be but humane to allay;
being determined (as we are) not to profit by encouraging it.
Do you conceive that under the power which you have recently received, you are authorized to enter into
negotiation and to sign any Convention upon this subject? Do you conceive, if that be not within your
competence, you could exchange with me ministerial notes upon it?
Nothing could be more gratifying to me than to join with you in such a work, and, I am persuaded, there
has seldom, in the history of the world, occurred an opportunity when so small an effort of two friendly
Governments might produce so unequivocal a good and prevent such extensive calamities.
I shall be absent from London but three weeks at the utmost; but never so far distant but that I can receive
and reply to any communication within three or four days.
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I have the honor to be
My Dear Sir, with great respect and esteem Your obedient and faithful servant
George Canning
R. Rush, Esqr.
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